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ABSTRACT
There is much evidence that intellectual property rights (IPR) protection stimulates
trade flows between countries. Yet less is known whether this effect is stronger for
technology-intensive products. Using data for 119 countries over the period 1976–2010,
this paper shows that the impact of IPR protection on manufacturing imports is sig-
nificantly stronger for products with greater technology embodiment, as measured by
their R&D intensity. An increase in the level of IPR protection leads to 22 per cent faster
increase in the value of imports of products at the 90th percentile of R&D intensity than
products at the 10th percentile.
KEYWORDS Intellectual property rights; international trade; product categories
JEL CLASSIFICATIONS F, O, O
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1. Introduction
Intellectual property rights (IPR) protection is generally assumed to stimulate innova-
tion and growth (Duguet and LeLarge 2012; Gould and Gruben 1996; Sakakibara and
Branstetter 2001). This can be through providing incentives for innovative activities by
domestic firms, but might also due to a higher level of technology diffusion from abroad.
One important diffusion channel is the import of sophisticated products. According to
the theory formalised by Maskus and Penubarti (1995), increased IPR protection in the
domestic market can affect imports in two opposing ways. On the one hand, foreign
firms have a greater incentive to export their products to the domestic market, as IPR
protection reduces the risk of piracy by domestic competitors. This is termed the mar-
ket expansion effect as foreign firms increase sales in the market. On the other hand,
by reducing the ability of local domestic firms to imitate foreign products, the exporter
has greater market power which could lead the foreign firm to curtail sales. This coun-
tervailing effect is coined the market power effect. It is theoretically ambiguous which
effect dominates since both effects are at work and may cancel each other out. A large
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empirical literature generally finds that higher levels of IPR protection stimulate trade
flows for manufacturing products, suggesting the market expansion effect tends to be
stronger (Awokuse and Yin 2010; Falvey, Foster, and Greenaway 2009; Rafiquzzaman
2002; Weng, Yang, and Huang 2009).1
While the market expansion effect of increased IPR protection on trade is well estab-
lished, there is little agreement and evidence on the possible heterogeneity in respon-
siveness of imports to IPR protection. This evidence is important because not all IPR
protection is related to products that might provide technology spillovers. For example,
it might be related to protection of brand names of consumer products mainly leading to
imports that embody little technological know-how, in contrast to, say, machinery. From
the perspective of enhancing growth, one would be interested in the impact of IPR on
imports of technologically-advanced products. This is especially relevant for low- and
middle-income countries, as importing technology-intensive products can be an impor-
tant channel of knowledge diffusion from advanced countries and thus be a path towards
higher growth and income levels (Keller 2004).
Several studies that have attempted to shed light on this issue have produced mixed
results. On the one hand, strengthening IPR protection is found to have no signif-
icant impact on products with greater technology embodiment (Co 2004; Fink and
Primo Braga 1999; Maskus and Penubarti 1995). Whereas, others find increased IPR
protection has a particularly strong impact on products that are knowledge-intensive
(Awokuse and Yin 2010) or industries that are patent-sensitive (Ivus 2010). Besides their
obvious differences in the data sample used, a more fundamental reason that could
explain the mixed results is the empirical approach employed. All these studies relied
on dividing import flows by product and separately analysing the subsample in probing
how stronger IPR protection affects trade.2 Though helpful and intuitive, the approach
is not suited to examine a differential effect as it does not directly compare and test
whether the difference is statistically significant across products in terms of technology
content.
Themain contribution of this paper is to provide systematic evidence on the differen-
tial effects that variations of IPR have on trade, contingent upon the technology intensity
of a product category. This evidence can be seen as an important addition to the con-
tinuing debate regarding the impact of the contentious agreement on the Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) signed in 1994.3 TRIPs is an interna-
tional agreement administered by the World Trade Organisation that sets the minimum
standards for various forms of intellectual property regulation. This agreement came into
effect on 1 January 1995.Has tougher IPR protectionmandated by TRIPs really restricted
trade in high-tech products and strengthened the monopolistic power of a few innova-
tors, as believed by the opponents of the agreement? To answer the question, I follow the
empirical strategy pioneered by Rajan and Zingales (1998) and proxy for the technology
intensity of an imported product by the extent to which the originating industry invests
in R&D. I then interact the resulting intensity indicator of the product categories with
the strength of IPR protection of the importing country. This method is econometrically
more appealing than what has been used in the existing literature, as (1) the interaction
term provides a direct test for the statistical significance of the differences between prod-
uct categories with varying degrees of R&D intensity; (2) it provides more convincing
evidence on causality since this approach is less subject to criticism about an omitted
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for the first time, quantify the magnitude of the effect-differentials across product cate-
gories. For instance, rather thanmerely stating that increased IPR protection has a larger
impact on R&D-intensive products, I now show by how much more the trade value will
increase for a product category that is more R&D intensive relative to one that is less
R&D intensive. This quantification is both interesting in its own right but it can also be
of great value to policy makers in assessing the economic significance of upgrading the
IPR system in the country.
The empirical analysis is based on data for manufacturing imports classified by 18
different product categories for a sample of 119 countries and over the period 1976–
2010. The stringency of IPR protection of the country is measured by the Ginarte and
Park (1997) index. Given the nature of IPR index, all the data are grouped into five-year
periods in this study. In other words, the data used in the analysis cover the following
years: 1976, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2010. The main findings are that the
impact of IPR on imports is indeed significantly positively correlated with R&D inten-
sity. I find that more stringent IPR protection leads to a 22 per cent faster increase in the
value of imports for products at the 90th percentile of R&D intensity (Office, accounting
and computingmachinery) than for products at the 10th percentile (Textiles, leather, and
footwear). This finding remains robust to alternativemeasures of R&D intensity of prod-
uct categories and to using a modified IPR index that corrects for the actual enforcement
of patent laws in the country.
By splitting the analysis into pre- and post-TRIPs time periods (i.e. 1976–90 versus
1995–2010), I show that the differential effect of IPR is significantly larger in the latter
period. This finding supports the notion that theTRIPs agreement stimulates, rather than
restricts, trade flows and it seems that the agreement is especially conducive to trading
technologically advanced products. If countries are further divided into three different
groups according to their income levels, I find that imports by middle-income coun-
tries are most sensitive to changes in IPR protection. Splitting the source of imports by
different income groups, I also show that the differential effect of IPR is only present
for imports coming from the middle-income countries. This result seems to suggest that
rather than attractingmore technology-intensive products from the advanced economies
as one would expect after strengthening IPR protection, the middle-income countries
only attracted more imports from countries of its own income group.
An important limitation of the present study is that the analysis is based on imports
value rather than volume as there are no product-specific price deflators available to
properly account for price changes over time. It could be argued that the faster increase in
imports value is driven by increases in price not quantity when price changes are coun-
try and product specific. As a sensitivity check to ensure that the results obtained in the
paper are not solely driven by changes in price but also (mainly) driven by changes in
quantity, this paper further exploits the quantity-unit data provided by UN Comtrade.
The quantity unit of imports is measured by counting weight in kilograms. Insofar as one
is content with the assumption that the weight of manufactured products has not signif-
icantly increased over time, analysis based on this imperfect quantity measure is still
useful and informative. It is reassuring that main findings of the paper remain robust
and qualitatively consistent.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the main empir-
ical strategy and the data used for analysis. Results and sensitivity analyses are presented





























2. Empirical strategy and data
In this section, I discuss the econometric approach to analysing the differential effects
of strengthening IPR protection on manufacturing imports, followed by a description of
the data and methods used to construct the key variables of interest.
2.1. Econometric specification
Themajority of the existing studies focused on examining themain effect of IPR on trade
and relied on dividing imports by product category to identify the differential effect. This
approach, however, is not suitable to examining the heterogeneity in responsiveness of
trade to IPR protection as it has twomajor limitations. First, the number of observations
diminishes greatly after splitting the sample by product. This makes it harder to find a
significant effect. Second, even if the effect can be identified as in, for example, Awokuse
and Yin (2010), it cannot be directly compared or tested whether the difference is sta-
tistically significant across products, let alone drawing implications about the economic
significance of the differential effect. To analyse the differential effect of IPR, I adapt from
the approach of Rajan and Zingales (1998) by estimating the following equation:
lnMc,i,t = β ·
[
IPRc,t × RDi
]+ ηc,t + ηi,t + c,i,t (1)
where the nominal value of imports M for country c,4 product group i, in year t is
expressed in natural logarithm;5 IPR denotes the stringency of a country’s IPR protec-
tion over time; RD is the product-level indicator for technology intensity, as measured
by R&D expenditures as a percentage of value added of the industry which delivered
the import; ηc,t represents all the country-level factors that can vary with time, such as
income levels, openness to trade, exchange rate movements, differences in general infla-
tion, and institutional quality; ηi,t captures all the product-level factors that can vary
over time, such as global trends in productivity and prices or in the demand for a product.
Note that these two set of dummies also capture country-, product-, and time-specific
fixed effects so that including them separately is not needed. εc,i,t is the idiosyncratic
error term.
The coefficient β measures whether more stringent IPR protection leads to higher
values of imports of products that are more R&D-intensive and if so, the size of the coef-
ficient would reflect the magnitude of this differential effect. Given the theory that tech-
nologically advanced products are more prone to imitation and hence more sensitive to
changes in IPR protection, β is expected to be positive and significant when the market
expansion effect dominates.
2.2. Proxy for IPR protection
As widely used in the literature, the strength of a country’s IPR protection is measured
by an index developed by Ginarte and Park (1997) and further extended by Park (2008).
This index, which I will indicate by G–P in the remainder, is constructed for 122 coun-
tries and quinquennially for the period 1960–2010. Five facets of patent laws are captured
in the G–P index: the extent of IPR coverage, membership in international patent agree-
ments, provisions for loss of protection, formal enforcement mechanisms, and duration
of protection. Each component was further decomposed into characteristics determin-
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Table . The means of the Ginarte–Park IPR index.
        –
High income . . . . . . . . .%
Mid income . . . . . . . . .%
Low income . . . . . . . . .%
Notes: The classiﬁcation of the income groups is according to the ranking provided by the
World Bank () for year . Countries with income per capita less than $ are classiﬁed
as low income, the income range for the mid-income countries is between $ and $,
and high-income countries are those with income per capita larger than $.
various kinds of inventions in a country, ranging from the patentability of chemical prod-
ucts to the existence of utility models. Membership in patent agreements indicates the
number of international treaties a country is a signatory. Each of these subcomponents
was assigned a value of one if present and zero if absent, with the component score being
the sumof these values as a percentage of themaximumvalue. Adding up the component
scores, the final G–P index is indicated by a continuous value ranging from zero to five,
with a higher number signalling more stringent patent protection. This index is consid-
ered as the best indicator available in the literature and it has themajor advantage over the
other popular measure, the index of Rapp and Rozek (1990), in that it is constructed for
different years which allows for analysis of the index over time. The Rapp–Rozek index,
on the other hand, is merely available for one single year. Conceptually, the G–P index is
also preferred because by considering various facets of patent protection in greater detail
the G–P index is better able to capture variations in patent laws than the subjective and
unit-incremental approach used in Rapp–Rozek (Kanwar and Evenson 2009).6
In general, the world has witnessed a strong increase in IPR protection during the
past half-century. The world average of the G–P index value soared from 1.26 in 1960
to 3.33 in 2010. The country that has upgraded most in terms of the strength of IPR
protection is (South) Korea, with no IPR protection in 1960 to become one of the most
highly IPR protected nations in 2010 (IPR index value 4.33). Somalia, on the other hand,
experienced the smallest increase in IPR protection, with an index value of 1.33 in 1960
and 1.46 in 2010. It may not come as a surprise that the US, according to the G–P index,
provides the best IPR protection across all countries at any point in time (3.83 in 1960
to 4.88 in 2010). Myanmar offers the poorest IPR protection in the world (index value
of 0.2 in 2010). If countries are divided into three different groups depending on their
income levels, it can be seen that the middle-income countries have strengthened their
patent protectionsmost during the period of investigation and the largest increase in IPR
protection, across all income groups, took place in 1995, the year in which the TRIPs
agreement came into effect (Table 1).
2.3. De jure versus de factor IPR protection
Despite being the most preferred index to use in empirical research, the G–P index also
has amajor limitation in that it is a de juremeasure, reflecting laws and agreements, rather
than the actual, de facto, degree of enforcement in the country. In one of the robustness
analyses, I try to correct for the degree of enforcement of patent laws in the country by
using data on the World Governance Indicators (World Bank 2015).7 It seems plausi-





























Figure . De jure versus de factor IPR indexes in .
protection enforcement. If the governance of a country is completely ineffective, then de
facto IPR protection is likely to be absent regardless of the degree of protection indicated
by theG–P index (i.e. de jure protection).Given that theWGI consist of six indicators and
each indicator ranks the countries on a scale from 0 to 100, I take an unweighted average
of these six components and divide the final composite score by 100. This means that I
obtain a scaling factor ranging from 0-1, where a higher value indicates a more effective
government and, by assumption, a more effective enforcement of patent laws. I multiply
the scaling factor with the original G–P index and denote it as the enforcement-adjusted
IPR index (IPRe).8 As mentioned, if a country has perfect governance, the scaling fac-
tor would be one meaning that the rules written down in the book are strictly enforced
(IPRe = IPRGP × 1). On the contrary, if the governance of a country is completely inef-
fective, the scaling factor is zero and the enforcement-adjusted IPR index would be zero
as well regardless of the value of de jure IPR protection (IPRe = IPRGP × 0). For illus-
trative purposes, I plot these two indexes in Figure 1 where the vertical axis denotes de
jure IPR protection and the horizontal axis denotes de factor IPR protection. The 45° line
corresponds to perfect enforcement of de jure IPR protection. The closer the countries
locate to the 45° line, the better the enforcement of de jure IPR protection. It can be seen
that the US has the best de jure IPR protection, while Scandinavian countries provide the
best de facto protection.9
2.4. Data on imports (value and quantity)
The data on imports are retrieved from the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics
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the trade commodities are classified by product categories according to three different
versions of the Standard International Trade Classification (i.e. SITC Rev.1, Rev.2, Rev.3,
respectively). Each classification corresponds to a different time span of data availabil-
ity.10 Since SITC Rev.1 is too outdated to link products to industries based on Interna-
tional Standard Industry Classification (ISIC) and data in SITC Rev.3 is available for a
much shorter time span, I opt for the commodity classification based on SITC Rev.2 at
4-digit for a sample of 119 countries. Given the nature of IPR index data, the trade data –
denominated in US dollars – is also collected every 5 years over the period 1976-2010.11
Thus, the data used in analysis cover the following years: 1976, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995,
2000, 2005 and 2010.
The value of the world’s total imports has proliferated between 1976 and 2010. For
my sample of countries, the value has increased by more than 25 times. If countries are
grouped into three different income levels, the low-income countries are found to have
increased their imports value most followed by the middle-income. In addition, among
18 different product categories the imports value has grown most for communication
equipment, computing machinery and pharmaceuticals.
Since imports value comprises price and quantity, the significant increase in the value
could either due to changes in price, quantity, or both. As a crude sensitivity check,
I exploit the quantity-unit data provided by UN Comtrade. Ideally, the quantity data
should be measured by the number of items traded (a pure quantity effect), but 80 per
cent of the quantity data, thus the vast majority, is measured by counting weight in kilo-
grams.12 This quantity measure is imperfect to capture the volume of imports, as the
number of items traded may not have changed but the unit weight of each item could
change. If the weight of manufactured products has not increased significantly over time,
looking at imports quantity measured by weight in kilograms could still be useful. For
the same sample of countries, the weight of total imports experienced a similar scale of
increase of 24.5 times from 1976 to 2010. This is only slightly smaller than the increase
in imports value in the same period. In addition, the weight of imports, akin to imports
value, is also found to have increased most in low-income countries, followed by mid-
and high-income ones. Thus, albeit counting weight in kilograms is a rather crude mea-
sure for the volume of imports, the similar data features/patterns observed between the
two are comforting.
2.5. R&D intensity across product categories
What is the technology intensity of a product? Standard practice is to trace the R&D
intensity of the industry producing the good as product-level information is typically not
available. Thus, I link products (say computers) to industries (in this case office, account-
ing and computing machinery) and measure the technology intensity of a product cate-
gory according to their corresponding industry R&D expenditures. The industry indica-
tor for R&D intensity is only available at the level of 18 product groups, together covering
all manufacturing industries. This data is retrieved from the OECD STAN Database for
Structural Analysis for a sample of 33 countries and over the period 1987-2009. Indus-
tries are classified according to ISIC Revision 3 (ISIC Rev.3) and the intensity value is
calculated as the share of R&D expenditures in total value added. Thanks to the concor-
dance codes provided by Affendy, Yee, and Satoru (2010), the product categories based






























Figure . Ranking of R&D intensity by product categories.
Given that the variation of R&D intensity in an industry over time is rather limited, it
seems sensible to smooth out the time variation (i.e. RD = ∑RDt/T ).13 In addition, I
follow Rajan and Zingales (1998) in using the values for the US as the baseline proxy for
the other countries. This is a practical choice since technological industry characteristics
are generally unobservable formost countries andmust be proxied in a benchmark coun-
try. The US is chosen as the benchmark country because its data is generally of a better
quality and less prone to bias due to market distortion (Nunn 2007; Rajan and Zingales
1998). While the actual R&D intensity value of a product group may differ from country
to country, what really matters is the ranking of product groups based on those intensity
values.14 That is, regardless of the size of the intensity values, pharmaceuticals are likely
to be R&D intensive products in other parts of the world just as in the US; while textiles,
in comparison, will be R&D non-intensive across the globe. It is also shown in a recent
paper by Ciccone and Papaioannou (2016) that using the US data to proxy for industry
technological characteristics for other countries is more likely to result in an attenuation
bias than otherwise (i.e. the estimator yields a lower bound on the true effect).
As a robustness check and to show that results are unlikely to be biased due to the use
of US data as proxy, I also consider using all the data that are available from the OECD
STANdatabase and take an unweighted average of the R&D intensity values for the entire
sample ofOECD countries. Figure 2 provides an overview of the distribution of the prod-
uct categories with varying degrees of R&D intensity. As anticipated, the majority of the
product categories have a similar ranking between the two indicators but the size of the
intensity values is noticeably smaller in theOECD indicator. For instance, theR&D inten-
sity value of computing machinery (industry code C30) of the OECD indicator is only
about half of the value of the US indicator (0.15 versus 0.3). As will be discussed later,
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In addition to using the continuous approach, it is also helpful to consider splitting
product categories into two major groups: R&D intensive versus R&D non-intensive
as in Ivus (2010). The rationale behind this is the following. If most of the variations
are between the two groups, the magnitude of the effect should then remain similar
to the continuous approach where IPR is interacted with the R&D intensity value of
each product category. However, if product categories are highly heterogeneous, then
treating different product categories as homogeneous in a group is likely to significantly
underestimate the differential effect. As a standard practice, the product groups are split
at the median value of R&D intensity (i.e. C29 in both rankings).
3. Empirical results
In this section, I discuss the main empirical findings with first results of de jure IPR
protection and its robustness to alternative specifications, followed by a comparison with
the results of de factor IPR protection. By splitting the analysis into different time periods
and dividing importing countries into different income groups, I then study where is the
differential effect mostly concentrated. Finally, I discuss the results of splitting imports
by country of origin.
3.1. Analysis based on the full sample
The results for equation (1) using the baseline US R&D intensity indicator and the ordi-
nary least squares (OLS) estimator are presented in the first two columns of Table 2
where the coefficient β is, as anticipated, positive and highly significant. This suggests
that for more R&D-intensive products, the impact of more stringent IPR protection is
significantly larger than products that embody little R&D or technology. This coefficient
implies that if a country increases its IPR protection, the imports value will increase by
22 per cent more for a product category at the 90th percentile of R&D intensity (Office,
accounting and computingmachinery) than for products at the 10th percentile (Textiles,
leather and footwear).15
As noted before, this result could suffer from a price bias since imports value com-
prises price and quantity. Due to the lack of data on product-specific price deflators,
nominal values of imports cannot be properly deflated.16 As an alternative and a rough
sensitivity check, I resort to using the quantity data measured by weight in kilograms. As
shown in columns (3) and (4) of Table 2, comforting results emerge if analysis is based on
this quantity measure. IPR remains to be more important for goods that are more R&D
intensive than those that are less R&D intensive. What is interesting to note is that the
magnitude of the differential effect has becomemuch smaller. It is about half of the size of
the analysis under imports value (column 2, Table 2). This smaller magnitude could due
to (a) the removal of the price effect; (b) a potential downward bias resulted frommanu-
factured products have become lighter in weight. Despite of the possible causes, it is reas-
suring that results remain qualitatively consistent and the analysis based on the quantity
measure, though imperfect, can be seen as a useful robustness check. This is especially
true in light of the evidence that price had actually declined in some R&D-intensive sec-
tors such as semiconductor or IT-related products (Aizcorbe 2006; Berndt and Rappa-
port 2001) which would bias against finding any significant effect when imports values






























Table . The diﬀerential eﬀects of IPR on imports.
() () () () () () ()
Value Value Quantity Quantity Growth Value Value
IPR × RDUS .∗∗∗ .∗∗∗ .∗∗∗ .∗∗∗ .∗∗∗
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
IPR .∗∗∗ .∗∗∗
(.) (.)










Year ﬁxed eﬀect Yes Yes
Country-year
ﬁxed eﬀect
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product-year
ﬁxed eﬀect
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N       
R . . . . . . .
Notes: Columns () and () use nominal imports value, denominated in US dollars, as the dependent
variable and R&D intensity values are computed based on the US data. Columns () and () explore the
quantity data provided by UN Comtrade where quantity is measured by counting weight in kilograms.
Column () calculates the dependent variable as the growth rate of imports value. Colum () splits 
product groups into two broad categories, R&D intensive and R&D non-intensive. The dichotomous split
is identical no matter which intensity indicator is used (US or OECD). Column () calculates R&D intensity
based on an unweighted average of OECD countries. Standard errors shown in parentheses are
heteroscedastic robust to country-industry clustering. ∗∗∗p < . , ∗∗p < ., ∗p < ..
To check that the results using imports value are not driven by price differentials
between R&D-intensive and R&D non-intensive products, I also examine the growth
of imports value. As shown in column (5) of Table 2, imports of R&D-intensive products
indeed also grow faster than products that are less R&D intensive.
The results also remain qualitatively consistent when product categories are split into
R&D-intensive and R&Dnon-intensive groups (see column 6 of Table 2). The coefficient
remains significantly different from zero and taking the estimate at face value, this sug-
gests that more stringent IPR protection leads to an 8 per cent faster increase in the value
of imports for the R&D-intensive product group than the R&D non-intensive group.
Comparing this finding to the prior results obtained under the continuous approach
where the differential effect for a R&D-intensive product category and a R&D non-
intensive one could be as large as 22 per cent, this difference in the magnitude suggests
that omitting product-specific variations in terms of technology content, as measured by
R&D intensity, could drastically underestimate the size of the differential impact of IPR
protection on manufacturing imports. Moreover, as noted earlier the import sensitivi-
ties differ highly between computingmachinery and pharmaceuticals, even though both
of them are classified as R&D-intensive products. Pooling them into one single group
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Table . Sensitivity check by dropping one product group at a time.
() ()
Excluding IPR × RDUS IPR × RDOECD N R
C Wood and products of wood .∗∗∗ (.) .∗∗∗ (.)  .
CT Textiles, leather, footwear .∗∗∗ (.) .∗∗∗ (.)  .
CT Manufacturing n.e.c. .∗∗∗ (.) .∗∗∗ (.)  .
CT Paper, printing, publishing .∗∗∗ (.) .∗∗∗ (.)  .
CT Food, beverage, tobacco .∗∗∗ (.) .∗∗∗ (.)  .
CT Basic and fabricated metal .∗∗∗ (.) .∗∗∗ (.)  .
C Other non-metallic minerals .∗∗∗ (.) .∗∗∗ (.)  .
C Rubber and plastic products .∗∗∗ (.) .∗∗∗ (.)  .
C Coke and petroleum products .∗∗∗ (.) .∗∗∗ (.)  .
C Machinery and equipment .∗∗∗ (.) .∗∗∗ (.)  .
C Electrical machinery .∗∗∗ (.) .∗∗∗ (.)  .
CX Chemicals excl. pharms .∗∗∗ (.) .∗∗∗ (.)  .
C Motor vehicles and trailers .∗∗∗ (.) .∗∗∗ (.)  .
C Radio, TV and communication .∗∗∗ (.) .∗∗∗ (.)  .
C Other transport equipment .∗∗∗ (.) .∗∗∗ (.)  .
C Pharmaceuticals .∗∗∗ (.) .∗∗∗ (.)  .
C Computing machinery .∗∗∗ (.) .∗∗(.)  .
C Medical instruments .∗∗∗ (.) .∗∗∗ (.)  .
Notes: Column () uses R&D intensity indicator based on the US values, while column () uses the
alternative R&D intensity indicator by taking an unweighted average across all OECD countries and
over the period –. All speciﬁcations include the country-year and the product-year ﬁxed
eﬀects. The last two columns denote the sample size (N) and the model-of-ﬁt (R) for speciﬁcations
using the US R&D intensity values. Standard errors shown in parentheses are heteroscedastic robust
to country-industry clustering. ∗∗∗p < . , ∗∗p < ., ∗p < ..
3.2. Sensitivity analysis by dropping product groups
Since a few product categories have very large R&D intensity values, it seems sensible
to check whether the results are driven by any specific product category. As shown in
Table 3 where each product category is excluded once at a time, results remain robust and
qualitatively consistent. There are, however, two product categories that warrant further
explanation, as the exclusion of these two categories affects the magnitude of the results
most significantly. First, after excluding the pharmaceuticals (C2423) the size of the dif-
ferential effect became much more pronounced than the baseline specification in which
all the product categories are pooled together. This increase in the magnitude seems to
imply that imports of pharmaceuticals may not be that sensitive to IPR protection as the
R&D intensity value predicts. This finding is consistent with the work of Delgado, Kyle,
andMcGahan (2013) who find that the impact of IPR protection on imports of pharma-
ceuticals is relatively low becausemerely copying pharmaceutical products is not likely to
be successful in capturing the market shares as complementary resources in distribution
also play a significant role. In addition, according toCohen,Nelson, andWalsh (2000) the
pharmaceutical industry relies most heavily on secrecy in protecting its product innova-
tions rather than patent protection. In contrast, there is a sizable drop in themagnitude of
the differential effect after excluding computingmachinery (C30). Thismight be because
electronic products are relatively easier to imitate or copy through reverse engineering.
Therefore, relative to other product categories imports of computing machinery are par-
ticularly sensitive to changes in IPR protection and leaving it out from the analysis would





























Figure . Comparing the size of the marginal eﬀects.
These results also remain robust when the alternative OECD R&D intensity indicator
is used for analysis (column 7 in Table 2 and column 2 in Table 3). Similarly, the exclusion
of pharmaceuticals leads to a stronger differential effect, and the exclusion of computing
machinery leads to a significantly weaker effect. Whereas, dropping any other product
category has modest impact on the quantitative results. Note that the coefficient estimate
β appears to be over twice as largewhen theOECD intensity indicator is used (1.69 versus
0.72, column 7 of Table 2), but this does not imply that the differential effect of IPR is
doubled. Since the difference-in-difference approach captures a differential effect rather
than amain effect, it is more informative to examine themarginal effect of IPR in relation
to the associated R&D intensity values.
As shown in Figure 3 where 18 product categories are denoted by circles or triangles,
depending on the intensity indicator used, the magnitude of the marginal effect remains
very similar between the two intensity indicators.17
3.3. Additional analyses
So far, the discussion of the results has been centred around the effect of de jure IPR
protection. In the first column of Table 4, I show that the baseline result, from column
(2) of Table 2, does not change, both qualitatively and quantitatively, if the alternative
de factor IPR index is used for analysis.18 This suggests that the prior results obtained
under de jure IPR protection are not likely to be biased due to mismeasurement of the
true stringency of IPR protection.
To gain further insights, I split the analysis into different time periods. If imports of
technology-intensive products are truly more sensitive to the stringency of IPR protec-
tion as the theory predicts, it is likely that the differential effect will be more pronounced
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Table . Additional analyses.
() () () ()
IPRe × RDUS IPR × RDUS IPR × RDUS IPRcGroup × RDUS N R
All combined .∗∗∗  .
(.)
Pre-TRIPs .∗∗  .
(.)
Post-TRIPs .∗∗∗  .
(.)
Imported by
High income –.  .
(.)
Low income .  .
(.)
Mid income .∗∗∗  .
(.)
Imports from
High income .  .
(.)
Low income .  .
(.)
Mid income .∗∗∗  .
(.)
Notes: Column () applies the ‘enforcement-adjusted’ IPR index by using data from the World Governance
Indicators. Column () splits the analysis into pre-TRIPs and post-TRIPs time periods. That is, – versus
–. Column () distinguishes importing countries between high-income, mid-income and low-middle
income countries. The distinction is according to  GNP per capita provided by the World Bank ().
Column () splits the origin of imports into high-income, low-income and middle-income country groups. All
speciﬁcations include the country-year and the product-year ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard errors shown in
parentheses are heteroscedastic robust to country-product clustering. ∗∗∗p < . , ∗∗p < ., ∗p < ..
mandated by the TRIPs agreement. The reason for this is that as the world improves IPR
protection, there is a greater incentive to develop new and improved products that are
more technologically advanced. As a result, the technology content of the productswould
increase and therefore the sensitivity to changes in IPR protection is likely to be higher
as well.19 As shown in column (2) of Table 4, the differential effect is present in both pre-
and post-TRIPs time periods, suggesting that the qualitative results are not sensitive to
the choice of time intervals. The size of the effect, however, is close to four times larger
in the latter than the former period. This finding seems to support the notion that the
TRIPs agreement enhances trade and it is especially conducive to trade in knowledge-
intensive products.20 If I divide the sample of importing countries by income groups (see
Appendix for the full classification of countries by income groups [Table A1]), I show
that the effect is the highest among middle-income countries, while there is no signifi-
cant effect for high-income and low-income countries (column 3, Table 4). This finding
is in line with what one would expect sincemiddle-income countries improved their IPR
most during the period of investigation (see Table 1). Thus, if IPRprotection is trulymore
effective in promoting knowledge-intensive trade, the differential effect should be most
prominent for those countries. Moreover, it also seems to imply that it is not the absolute
level of IPR protection that helps countries to import technology-intensive products but
it is the level of protection relative to the other countries.
Since close to 60 per cent of the world’s total patent applications originate from high-
income economies (WIPO 2015), exports from these countries are more likely to have





























that the differential effect should be most prominent for imports sourced from high-
income countries. In column (4) of Table 4, I split imports by the origin of three dif-
ferent income groups and I find that the differential effect is not present for imports
coming from high-income countries, but only present for imports from middle-income
countries.21 One possible explanation for this could be that the market expansion effect
and the market power effects are cancelled out for imports coming from high-income
economies. This finding, in fact, also resembles one of the results of Awokuse and Yin
(2010) in their analysis of China’s imports. Another possible explanation could also be
that the final production stage (and thus gross exports) of technology-intensive prod-
ucts are increasingly taking place in middle-income, rather than high-income countries.
International production fragmentation has rapidly increased since the 1990s, in particu-
lar in producing high-tech goods such asmachinery and electronics (Timmer et al. 2014).
4. Conclusion
This paper is the first to rigorously examinewhether increased IPRprotection has a larger
impact on imports of more R&D-intensive products. Employing a large panel data and
the difference-in-difference approach pioneered by Rajan andZingales (1998), this paper
finds that the impact of strengthening IPR protection is significantly stronger for imports
ofmore technology-intensive products. The estimates imply thatmore stringent IPRpro-
tection leads to an increase in the value of imports by 22 per cent higher for products
at the 90th percentile of R&D intensity (computing machinery) relative to products at
the 10th percentile (textiles, leather, and footwear). This finding is robust to alternative
measures of R&D intensity of product categories and to using a modified IPR index that
corrects for the potential enforcement bias of patent protection in the country.
Anothermajor finding of this study is that the product categories are highly heteroge-
nous in their responsiveness to changes in IPR protection. The dichotomous approach,
i.e. classifying products into technology-intensive and non-intensive groups, used in pre-
vious studies (e.g. Ivus 2010) is unable to reveal such differences within the group and
is likely to significantly understate the magnitude of the differential effect of IPR on
imports.
The differential effect is also found to be more prominent in the post-TRIPs period
and in imports by the middle-income countries. This seems to suggest that by conform-
ing to the minimum standards of intellectual property protection set out by the World
Trade Organisation, the middle-income countries have benefited most in importing
technologically advanced products. By splitting the origin of imports into high-, low- and
middle-income countries, I showed that the majority of R&D-intensive imports do not
originate from high-income countries as one would expect, but they originate from its
own middle-income group of countries. I have argued that this finding could mean that
(1) the market expansion and market power effects are cancelled out for imports com-
ing from advanced economies; or (2) that the production of some technology-intensive
products (e.g. electronics) increasingly takes place in middle-income, rather than high-
income countries due to international production fragmentation (Timmer et al. 2014).
Irrespective of the underlying cause, this result seems to imply that by strengthening IPR
protection the middle-income countries have succeeded in attracting more technology-
intensive products from other middle-income countries.
Like most of the previous studies, a major limitation of this paper is that I cannot
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quantity of products traded and how much is attributable to increase in price. This is an
area for future research once more detailed data on product-specific prices have become
available. Insofar as one is content with the assumption that the weight of manufactured
products has not significantly increased over time, additional analyses based on imports
measured by weight in kilograms offer comforting evidence that the results obtained in
the paper are not solely driven by changes in price but also (and perhaps mainly) driven
by changes in quantity.
Notes
1. The only study that has found clear evidence supporting the presence of the market power effect
is by Smith (1999).
2. It is worth noting that rather than dividing import flows by product, Ivus (2010) groups indus-
tries into twomajor categories. This approach, however, forfeits themore useful industry/product
variations that could help to pin down the differential effect and place results into a better perspec-
tive. For example, albeit the market expansion effect is found to be stronger for patent-sensitive
industries vis-à-vis those that are patent-insensitive, nothing can be said about the differences,
which may well be large, within the group. The present study exploits the heterogeneities across
each product group and show that pooling industries/products into one single group is likely to
significantly underestimate the true differential effect of IPR protection on imports.
3. The major controversy over the TRIPs agreement is centred on the balance between the incen-
tives to encourage new inventions and the ease with which developing countries can access the
patented products and technology. A salient example is the pharmaceutical industry. The develop-
ment costs for new drugs can be very high and it may not be developed without a large (monop-
olistic) return ensured by patent protection that is respected across the globe. The adoption of
a uniformly strong patent protection worldwide would, however, raises the probability of very
expensive treatments for the growing epidemics that makes the least-developed countries worse
off (Kyle & McGahan, 2012).
4. Nominal imports values are used since there are no product-specific price deflators available to
properly account for price changes over time. One could use more general price deflators as a
proxy, such as the GDP or CPI price deflator (which would not have changed results presented
in the paper). But these generic price deflators do not really do justice to differing time trends in
product prices (e.g. semiconductors versus farm equipment). And they would also be subsumed
by the time fixed effect introduced in the model. As will be shown later in the paper, the results
are unlikely to be solely driven by changes in price.
5. To examine the differential effect, exports could also be used as the dependent variable since it
is the other side of the same coin. This paper prefers to use imports as it attempts to shed light
on how developing countries could attract knowledge-intensive goods, which can be an impor-
tant channel of international knowledge diffusion and thus be a path towards higher growth and
income levels (i.e. a growth-enhancing perspective). Given this goal/perspective, it seems more
intuitive and straightforward to approach the analysis using imports.
6. By consulting the legal text of each country’s patent laws, Rapp–Rozek made a rough and rather
subjective assessment of their conformity with theminimum standards proposed as guidelines by
the US Chamber of Commerce. More specifically, countries are assigned a score based on their
1984 patent system: 0=Nopatent laws, 1= Inadequate protection laws, no lawprohibiting piracy,
2= Seriously flawed laws, 3= Flaws in law, some enforcement law, 4=Generally good laws, and
5 = Protection and enforcement laws fully consistent with the minimum standards proposed by
the United States Chamber of Commerce (1987).
7. TheWorld Governance Indicators consist of six indicators: voice and accountability, political sta-
bility and absence of violence, control of corruption, government effectiveness, regulatory quality,
and rule of law.
8. In my sample, the country with the highest composite governance index is Finland (0.98), fol-
lowed by Denmark and New Zealand. On the other hand, Somalia, Iraq, and Myanmar have the
worst record of governance in the world.
9. The correlation between the G-P index and the ‘enforcement-adjusted’ index is above 0.86. This





























likely to lead to a substantial estimation bias, despite the fact that this measure overstates ‘true’
IPR stringency.
10. Trade data based on SITC Rev.1, Rev.2 and Rev.3 are available since 1962, 1976, and 1988,
respectively.
11. To increase the number of observations by including the year 1976, it is assumed that the value of
the G-P index in 1976 is the same as in 1975. By doing so, the trade data could then be matched
with the IPR index from 1976 onwards, instead of 1980. As a robustness check, analysis based on
the more restrictive sample is also performed. Results and findings remain consistent (available
upon request), though the exact magnitude of the coefficients differ somewhat.
12. More precisely, 78.5 per cent of the quantity data is measured by weight in kilograms, 12 per cent
is missing, 7 per cent is measured by the number of items traded. The remaining 2.4 per cent of
the data are measured in various other units, such as volume in cubic/liters.
13. Out of 18 product groups only 3 seem to have noticeable variations in their R&D intensity values
over time, namely Computing machinery, Medical instruments, and Pharmaceuticals. The rest
have a quite stable/constant R&D intensity values (see Appendix Figure A1).
14. Though relying only on rankings would affect the quantitative implications of my estimates.
15. This is calculated as: βˆ · (RD90th − RD10th). Plugging in the values, the differential effect of IPR
between these two product categories becomes: 0. 718∗(0.316–0.0096) = 22 per cent.
16. Deflate nominal imports values by a general price deflator, such as GDP price deflator, will not
change the results as this generic price deflator would be subsumed by the fixed effects introduced
in the model.
17. To be precise, the differential effect for a product category at the 90th percentile of R&D intensity
and one at the 10th percentile, measured by OECD intensity indicator, is approximately 24 per
cent. This is very similar to the 22 per cent obtained when the US R&D intensity indicator is used.
18. The amount of observations decreases because the World Governance Indicators are only avail-
able from 1996 onwards.
19. Note, the increase in the technology content of the products does not necessarily mean the tech-
nology intensity, as measured by the share of R&D expenditures in total value added, would
increase as well, as the increase in R&D expenditures is likely to be accompanied by an increase
in value added. Moreover, the increase in technology content of the products is likely to be dis-
proportionately more towards products that are R&D intensive relative to products that require
little R&D.
20. Results remain robust if dependent variable is replaced with the quantity measure (imports in
kilograms). The differential impact is found to be significant in the post-TRIPs period, while it
is insignificant in the pre-TRIPs period. This is in line with the finding that the enforcement of
TRIPs seems to be particularly helpful in promoting knowledge-intensive trade between coun-
tries.
21. This finding remains valid if I split the origin of imports into OECD and non-OECD countries.
Results available upon request.
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Table A. List of countries by income groups
High-income Low-income Middle-income
Australia Bangladesh Somalia Algeria Malaysia
Austria Benin Sri Lanka Angola Malta
Belgium Burk. Faso Sudan Argentina Mauritius
Canada Burundi Tanzania Bolivia Mexico
Cyprus Cent. Afr. Rep Togo Botswana Morocco
Denmark Chad Uganda Brazil Nicaragua
Finland China Vietnam Bulgaria P.N. Guinea
France Egypt Zambia Cameroon Panama
Germany Ethiopia Chile Paraguay
Hong Kong Ghana Colombia Peru
Iceland Guyana Congo Philippines
Ireland Haiti Costa Rica Poland
Israel Honduras Czech Rep. Portugal
Italy India Dominica Rep. Romania
Japan Indonesia Ecuador Russia
Luxembourg Kenya El Salvador S. Africa
N. Zealand Liberia Fiji Saudi Arabia
Netherlands Madagascar Gabon Senegal
Norway Malawi Greece Slovakia
Singapore Mali Grenada Swaziland
Spain Mauritania Guatemala Syria
Sweden Mozambique Hungary Thailand
Switzerland Myanmar Iran Trinidad & Tobago
Taiwan Nepal Iraq Tunisia
U.K. Niger Ivory Coast Turkey
U.S.A. Nigeria Jamaica Ukraine
Pakistan Jordan Uruguay
Rwanda Korea Venezuela
Sierra Leone Lithuania Zimbabwe
Notes: The classiﬁcation of the income groups is according to the ranking provided by the World Bank () for
year . Countries with income per capita less than $ are classiﬁed as low-income, the income range for
the mid-income countries is between $ and $, and high-income countries are those with income per
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Figure A. R&D intensity variations over time
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